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CHANGES IN THE TREATMENT OF THE
CLOSE CORPORATION UNDER THE NEW
KENTUCKY BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT'
A close corporation may be defined as one whose voting shares are
held by a single shareholder or a closely-knit group of shareholders.
It is usually small, though not always, and generally has no public
investors. The shareholders it does have are often quite active in
the management of the enterprise. 2 Historically the close corporation
has been largely ignored by the lawmakers; its particular needs have
been made subservient to those of the large, public-issue corporations.
If a small group wished to form a corporation in order to take advantage of the limited liability concept or preferential tax treatment,
such a group had to conform to the formalities required of large
corporations. The expense and inconvenience which often resulted
probably dissuaded many from donning the corporate veil.
In recent years, however, the courts and legislatures have begun
to recognize the peculiar problems of the close corporation. With the
adoption of the Model Business Corporation Act, Kentucky has taken
a major step toward easing those problems. Throughout this discussion
of changes in the Kentucky law on close corporations, one large
revision in particular must be kept in mind: the first sentence of Kentucky Revised Statutes Annotated [hereinafter KRSA] § 271A.175
states, "The business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed
by a board of directors except as may be otherwise provided in the
articles of incorporation" (emphasis added). Though probably too
cumbersome to be useful in a large public-issue corporation, this section permits the creators of a close corporation to split up all the functions traditionally exercised by the board of directors among the
shareholders and directors and even outsiders. Aside from the new
provisions on shareholder agreements, voting trusts, and the like,
1Constant references will be made in the footnotes to the provisions of both
the old (Ky. REv. STAT. ch. 271 (1971) [hereinafter cited as KRS]) and the new
corporation law (Ky. RIEv. STAT. ANN.ch. 271A. (Supp. 1972) [hereinafter cited
as KRSA]) and to the ABA-ALI MODEL Busnsmss CoR oRATON ACr (rev. ed.
1969). Where the Model Act provision is the same as, or similar to, the new
Kentucky provision, it will be included with each reference to the new act, without explanation. Model Act references will be made to MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT
ANN.2D (1971) for easy access to the drafters' comments and the cases included
therein.
2H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTmm Busnmss

ENTERPIsEs § 257 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as H. HENN, LAw OF ConpoRATIONS].
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this provision allows the members of the close corporation to structure
the enterprise in almost any manner they wish. Individual members
no longer need to make sure they have on their shareholder hat, or
their director bat, before they act; a provision in the articles may now
do away with the hats altogether.
For purposes of this discussion, the various provisions regulating
close corporations have been divided into three parts: (1) those
which are ancillary to the actual creation and continued existence
of the corporation; (2) those which may be, but are not necessarily,
integral to the creation and continued existence of the corporation;
and (3) those which are fundamental to the creation and continued
existence of the corporation. Both the old and new acts will be discussed and the strong and weak points of each will be analyzed.8
Hopefully, the superiority of Kentucky's new Business Corporation
Act, particularly in regard to close corporations, will be apparent at
the conclusion.
I.

ANCILLARY DvcEVs

A. Voting Trusts
A voting trust is created by an agreement among the shareholders
of a corporation and a trustee, or by several identical agreements
between individual shareholders and a common trustee, providing
that, for a designated period of time, control over the stock owned
by the shareholders shall be lodged in the trustee, either with or
3The problems of the one-man corporation will not be treated in the text
because the old and new acts are much the same. A one-man corporation may
be defined as a corporation with a single shareholder or a single major shareholder
and others who have nominal holdings in order to qualify as incorporators or
directors. H. HENN, LAW OF COPPOTATIONS § 258. The adoption of the Model
Act had little effect on Kentucky's existing law concerning one-man corporations.
Kentucky previously allowed one individual to form a corporation (KRS § 271.025;
KRSA § 271A.265; MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr ANN. 2D § 53 (1971)); acknowledge
the articles of incorporation (KRS § 271.035; KRSA § 271A.265; MODEL Bus. CoRP.
ACr ANN. 2D § 53 (1971)), and constitute the board of directors (KRS §
271.345(1); KRSA § 271A.180; MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACr ANN. 2D § 36 (1971)).
However, in the area of directors serving as officers, an important consideration for
one who wishes to form a one-man close corporation, several changes have been
made. The old statute declared that no officer need be a director and that any
two of the offices of vice-president, secretary, and treasurer could be combined in
one person. KRS § 271.355(1). Under that section, a corporation with a president,
vice-president, secretary and treasurer would need three persons to fill those offices.
The new act specifically provides that directors may be officers or employees
(KRSA § 271A.101(15); MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr ANN. 2D § 20 (1971)), and
that any two or more offices may be held by the same person in the one-man
corporation (KRSA § 271A.025). The Kentucky provision in this respect seems to
go even further than the Model Act, which states that "[any two or more offices
may be held by the same person except the offices of president and secretary."
MODEL Bus. CoRP. AcT ANN. 2D § 50 (1971).
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without a reservation to the owners or some other person of the power
to direct how the voting control shall be used. The essential feature
of the voting trust is "the delegation of group voting power for the
purpose of controlling corporate management."4 Kentucky has had a
voting trust statute for many years. 5 With the adoption of the new
act, however, a number of substantive and procedural changes have
been made. The old statute made voting trust certificates transferable
with the same effect as certificates of stock;6 the new act does not.
Also, the old act limited the liability of the trustee to actions for
negligence or malfeasance; 7 no such limitations are found in the new
act. And finally, the new act is not limited to domestic corporations
or to two or more shareholders. 8 Any number of shareholders of any
corporation, foreign or domestic, may now create a valid voting trust
in Kentucky. 9 The instrument creating the trust must be in writing,
and a copy must be filed at the corporation's registered office;10 the
trust may endure ten years only." Additionally, under the new act
the trustee must keep a record of the holders of voting trust certificates
and a copy of that record must be filed at the registered office. Both
the agreement and the record of trust certificate holders are to be
open for inspection by shareholders and holders of voting trust certificates. The last difference between the old and new acts appears
to be one of form rather than substance. The old act specifically
declared that share certificates subject to voting trusts had to be
surrendered and cancelled, with new certificates issued to the trustee; 12
the new act merely requires that the shareholder transfer his shares
to the trustee.' 8 In spite of the lack of specific directions in the new
act, however, it is obvious that the drafters of the Model Act contemplated some type of re-issue of certificates by the corporation to
the voting trustee. 14 Otherwise, it might prove quite difficult for the
trustee to vote the stock in his keeping.
4 3 W. FE'Crcmm, CYcLoPEDiA or Tnr LAW OF PRIVATE COaPORATIONS § 1705

(1917).
5KRS § 271.325.
6KRS § 271.325(5).
7KRS § 271.325(7) (d).
8KRS § 271.325(1).
9 KRSA § 271A.170(1); MODEL Bus. Corn'. ArANx.2b § 34 U11 (1971).
10 The old act called for a "duplicate original," while the new act requires
only a "counterpart" of the agreement.
11 The duration of voting trusts, limited by statute and the articles of incorpo-

ration, may not be extended by the court. In re Elless, 174 F.2d 925 (6th Cir.

1949).
12KRS § 271.325(4).
Is KRSA § 271A.170(1).
14 See MODEL Bus. Corn. AcT ANN. 2D § 34 1 2 (1971) and H. HEN, LAW OF
CORPOaA-ONS § 197.
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Other sections of the new act affect voting trusts. Shares standing
in the name of the trustee may be voted by him, in person or by proxy,
but only if the shares are actually transferred to him. However, if the
trustee is an administrator, guardian, executor, or committee, he may
vote the shares without the transfer."5 The old act allowed "fiduciaries"
to vote shares after transfer, but included nothing authorizing voting
privileges before transfer.' One provision found in the old act and
preserved in the new, though not a part of the Model Business Corporation Act; relates to shares held jointly by three or more fiduciaries.
Under that provision, the majority of the fiduciaries shall control the
voting of the shares unless the instrument or order appointing the
fiduciaries indicates otherwise. If the fiduciaries are equally divided,
either a beneficiary or a fiduciary may petition the court to appoint
7
an additional person to break the deadlock.'
Several provisions conferring rights on holders of voting trust
certificates are found in the new act. Holders of these certificates may
now bring derivative actions,' inspect the books and records, making
20
extracts therefrom, 19 and receive financial statements upon request.
Combined with the looser restrictions of the voting trust provision
itself, these sections make the use of the voting trust more attractive
to shareholders and more adaptable to the situations it may be re21
quired to cover.
' KRSA § 271A.165(6). The Model Act section omits "conservators" from the
list. MODEL Bus. Corn'. Acr ANN. 2D § 33 (1971).

16 KRS § 271.315(4).
17 KRSA § 271A.165(7) is substantially the same as KRS § 271.315(4).
18 KRSA § 271A.245; MoDEL Bus. Corn'. ACr ANN. 2D § 49 (1971). The old
Kentucky provision on derivative or "secondary" actions, KRS § 271.605, was
limited to shareholders.
19 KRSA § 271A.260(2) and (3). The Kentucky act in this regard differs
from the Model Business Corporation Act. KRSA § 271A.260(3) requires that
the person desiring to inspect the books, be he a shareholder of record or a holder
of a voting trust certificate, furnish the corporation an affidavit that, in effect,
states that he does not want the information for improper purposes. The Model
Act does not include this affidavit requirement. MODEL Bus. Coup. AcT ANN. 2D
§ 52 (1971). Both acts, however, state that if the person desiring the inspection
has used corporate records for wrongful purposes in the past, such use constitutes
a defense in avoiding the penalties provided for refusing to allow the inspection.
The old Kentucky act, KRS § 271.396(4), limited the right of inspection to shareholders, had no affidavit requirement, and mentioned no penalties or defenses for
refusing
to allow inspection.
2
0KRSA § 271A.260(5); MODEL Bus. CoRP. AcrAN. _N2
§ 52 (1971).
21Voting trusts are still not always upheld. See, e.g., Grogan v. Grogan, 322
S.W.2d 514 (Tex. 1959), where a Texas court declared void a voting trust the
purposes of which were to insure the election of directors who would retain the
general manager and establish the general manager's nephew as his successor. Only
by declaring a trust void or by appointing a new trustee can the voting power of
a voting trust be terminated. Le Roy Sargent & Co. v. McHarg, 174 N.W. 742

(S.D. 1919).
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B. ShareholderAgreements
In many jurisdictions, shareholders have long been able to make
agreements among themselves concerning the affairs of the corpora-

tion without having to meet the formal requirements of the voting
trust. These shareholder, or pooling, agreements generally consist of
an advance decision by a group of shareholders to exercise their voting
rights in a certain manner; as long as the rights of minority shareholders are not ignored or the directors unduly deprived of their
discretion in the management of the corporation, such agreements are
usually valid and enforceable. 22 In Kentucky, however, shareholder
agreements have been looked upon with disfavor. The old act neither
allowed nor disallowed such agreements, but in Haldeman v. Haldeman,2 3 the Court of Appeals held that an agreement among three
shareholders providing for the election and maintenance of two of
them as officers of the corporation was invalid as contrary to public
policy. The Court ruled that public policy prohibited the enforcement
of an agreement by which a shareholder attempts to bargain away his
right to vote according to his best judgment and in the best interests
of the corporation. 24 Since Haldeman, there has been little evidence
of use of shareholder agreements in Kentucky.2 5
With the passage of the new act, Kentucky has joined the jurisdictions that specifically allow shareholder agreements. The act states
simply and without equivocation that agreements among shareholders
shall be valid and enforceable and not subject to the provisions of the
act relating to voting trusts.26 Corporate practitioners and shareholders
of Kentucky corporations are now free to create agreements among
themselves that affect their corporations, secure in the knowledge
that such agreements will not be found invalid per se by the courts.
There are limits, however; the courts may still strike particular agree22H. HENN, LAw OF CORPOATIONS §
23 197 S.W. 376 (Ky. 1917).
24 Id. at 382.

198.

25 There is authority in Kentucky for the use of shareholder agreements, however. In Gilchrist v. Collopy, 82 S.W. 1018 (Ky. 1904), the Court found valid an
agreement between two cities, which were the sole shareholders in a corporation
whose articles provided that five directors were to constitute the board, to the
effect that in alternate years one city would elect three directors and the other two.
The Court stated that it was "so absolutely practical and so eminently fair that
it had to be upheld.
26KRSA § 271A.170(2). This section is substantially the same as the Model
Act section, though it appears to be even more encompassing. MODEL Bus. CORP.
AcT ANN. 2D § 34 ff 2 (1971). The last sentence of the Model Act section reads:
"Such agreements shall not be subject to the provisions of this section regarding
voting trusts" (emphasis added). The Kentucky act omits the emphasized words,
and since other sections of both the Kentucky act and the Model Act affect voting
trusts, it can be argued that Kentucky's law is clearer and less subject to possible
entanglement with voting trusts than the Model Act provision.
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ments for sufficient cause. A brief look at the treatment accorded
various types of shareholder agreements in other jurisdictions may
serve to outline the boundaries within which such agreements may be
created.
A common purpose of shareholder agreements is to elect specific
persons as directors or officers. This type of agreement has been held
27
valid and not violative of public policy in a number of jurisdictions.
Also, an agreement between the sole shareholders of a corporation
that they would act jointly in all matters and follow a single course of
action in accordance with whatever decision they reached, has been
held valid. 28 In one case, an agreement that all policies, management,
and operation of the corporation would be by the unanimous consent
of the board of directors was allowed. 29 This particular agreement
involved the corporation's sole shareholders who also made up the
board of directors. In Katcher v. Ohsman,3 0 an agreement was upheld
under which two of the three shareholders of a corporation (the two
owned less than ninety per cent of the stock) promised the third that
all affirmative actions would require at least ninety per cent of the
vote, for both shareholder and director action. Other agreements that
have been valid include one which provided that the shareholders of
each faction in the corporation approve the salaries of the other faction
and vote their stock in such a way that the two factions would have
equal board representation; 3 ' another that required one shareholder
to vote for dissolution on the promise of another to pay him the
amount, if any, by which the sum obtained for the sale of the corporation's assets was less than his investment;32 and a third that bound the
33
corporation to purchase the stock of any shareholder upon his death.
Generally, agreements that deprive directors of their statutory
authority are not valid.3 4 In Burnett v. Word, Inc., for instance, a
27
In re Evening Journal Ass'n, 71 A.2d 158 (N.J. 1950); In re Roosevelt
Leather Hand Bag Co., 68 N.Y.S.2d 735 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Hayden v. Beane, 199
N.E. 755 (Mass. 1936); Harris v. Magrill, 131 Misc. 380, 226 N.Y.S. 621 (Sup. Ct.
1928); Fitzgerald v. Christy, 242 IMI.App. 343 (1926); Horn v. J. 0. Nesses
Lumber Co., 236 Ill.
App. 187 (1925); Thompson v. J. D. Thompson Carnation
Co., 116 N.E. 648 (Ill.
1917); Weber v. Della Mt. Mining Co., 94 P. 441 (Idaho
1908).
2
s Bingling Brothers-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, 53
A.2d 441 (Del. 1947).
29 Bator v. United Sausage Co., 81 A.2d 442 (Conn. 1951).
30 97 A.2d 180 (N.J. 1953).
1968).
3.1
Caller v. Caller, 238 N.E.2d 274 (Ill.
32 Wolf v. Arant, 77 S.E.2d 116 (Ga. 1953).
33 Brigham v. M & J Corp., 227 N.E.2d 915 (Mass. 1967).
34 Ford v. Magee, 160 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 759
(1947); Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 119 N.E. 559 (1918); McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934); Williams v. Fredericks, 175 So. 642
(La. 1937); Teich v. Kaufnan, 174 Ill.
App. 306 (1912); Harris v. Scott, 32 A.
770 (N.H. 1893).
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shareholder agreement to retain certain directors for a ten-year period
and to incur no indebtedness above a certain amount was allowed,
while a directors' agreement to the same effect was not, since it limited
the directors' discretion. 35 On the other hand, in Clark v. Dodge36 the
court upheld an agreement between two shareholders, who were also
directors, which provided that one of them would disclose a formula
vital to the enterprise to the son of the second shareholder; in return,
the other shareholder would vote, as a director, to keep the first shareholder on as general manager. The court stated that the shareholder
aspects of the agreement were perfectly valid and legal and then
allowed the directoraspects to stand on the ground that to do so would
harm no one.37 Such a broad rationale might certainly be useful to
shareholders in a close corporation seeking to limit the discretion of
the board.
In addition to those which seek to limit the directors' powers, other
types of agreements have been found invalid. A shareholder agreement
that had no time limit and no provision that it was applicable to
successor shareholders was held void in a recent Florida decision. 38
And Massachusetts has held in a number of cases that agreements not
joined in by all the shareholders are invalid.3 9 Also, a few jurisdictions
have found agreements involving the promise of officer positions to
be against public policy. 40
The fact that a court finds a particular agreement to be valid does
not necessarily mean that that agreement will be enforced. In some
cases the courts have denied enforcement for some reason other than
the invalidity of the agreement. An agreement which included the
provision that one of the members was to be president of the corporation was held valid, but the court denied enforcement. 41 The court
35 412 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. 1967).
36 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1986).
37See also Slonim v. Brodie, 109 N.Y.S.2d 440 (Sup. Ct. 1951); In re
Kirschner, 81 N.Y.S.2d 485 (Sup. Ct. 1948); In re Buckley, 183 Misc. 189, 50
N.Y.S.2d
54 (1944).
38
lBerkowitz v. Firestone, 192 So.2d 298 (Fla. 1966).
39
0dman v. Oleson, 64 N.E.2d 439 (Mass. 1946); Hellier v. Achorn, 151 N.E.
305 (Mass. 1926); Palmbaum v. Magulsky, 104 N.E. 746 (Mass. 1914); Woodruff
v. Wentworth, 133 Mass. 309 (1882); Guernsey v. Cook, 120 Mass. 501 (1876).
40 An agreement by which another person was to control the shareholder's
stock in consideration of that person's promise to obtain for the shareholder an
office in the corporation was held illegal and void as against public policy. Gage v.
Fisher, 65 N.W. 809 (N.D. 1895). An agreement under which shareholders
were to vote their stock together at a directors election and were to retain their
offices in the corporation was held invalid as against public policy only with
respect to the part involving the offices. Withers v. Edmonds, 62 S.W. 795 (Tex.
1901).
41 Fells v. Katz, 256 N.Y. 67, 175 N.E. 516 (1931). See similar holdings in
Tremsky v. Green, 106 N.Y.S.2d 572 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Blum v. Oxman, 190 Misc.
(Continued on next page)
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stated that the provision was merely an obligation to keep the individuals as president only as long as he remained loyal to the corporation's interests. Since he had entered into a competing business, the
other parties to the agreement were justified in refusing to retain him as
42
president.
When relief is granted for the breach of a shareholder agreement
it comes in several different forms. Some courts actually grant specific
performance, 43 while others have merely enjoined the parties from
acting in violation of the agreement. 44 In Ringling Bros.-Barnum &
Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling 5 the court declared that the
votes of the breaching party had no effect. And in E. K. Buck Retail
Stores v. Herkert,40 the court allowed damages for violation of a shareholder agreement.
The shareholder agreement is clearly a useful tool for controlling
the operation of a close corporation. Whether or not the shareholders
have carte blanche, though, remains to be seen. The simple pooling
agreement, involving shareholders only, should present no problem
under the new provision-such an agreement is clearly valid and
enforceable. However, problems may arise with shareholder agreements that attempt to tie the hands of the board of directors. It is
obvious that the drafters of the Model Act felt that the provisions of
this voting agreement section covered all corporate transactions "with47
out limit" whether they affected shareholders or directors or both.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky, however, has the final say. Consequently, shareholders contemplating the creation of a shareholder
agreement would do well to keep in mind the various valid and invalid
aspects of such agreements, as construed by courts of other jurisdictions discussed heretofore.
C. Restriction on Stock Transfers
In order to preserve the family or small-group form of the close
corporation, the participants have resorted to the practice of placing
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

647, 75 N.Y.S.2d 177 (1947); In re Roosevelt Leather Hand Bag Co., 68 N.Y.S.2d
735 42
(Sup. Ct. 1947).
Fells v. Katz, 175 N.E. 516 517 (N.Y. 1981).
43
Brigham v. M & I Corp., 227 N.E.2d 915 (Mass. 1967); Katcher v. Ohsman,
97 A.2d 180 (N.J. 1953); Martocci v. Martocci, 2 Misc.2d 330, 42 N.Y.S.2d 222

(1943);
44 Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936).
Kronenberg v. Sullivan County Steam Laundry Co., 91 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Sup.
Ct. 1949); Trefethen v. Amazeen, 36 A.2d 266 (N.H. 1944); Harris v. MagriU, 131

Misc. 880, 226 N.Y.S. 621 (Sup. Ct. 1928); Fitzgerald v. Christy, 242 Iln. App.
343 (1926).
45 53 A.2d 441 (Del. 1947).
40 62 N.W.2d 288 (Neb. 1954).
47
See MoDEL Bus. CoRp.AcT ANN. 2D § 35 2 (1971).
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restrictions on the transfer of the corporation's stock when it is issued.
These restrictions have occasionally clashed with the principle that
shares of stock are personal property and should be freely transferrable.
Even then, however, most authorities have recognized that some
restrictions are necessary. Fletcher, for instance, after referring to
shares of stock as personal property says:
[I]t is well-settled that the owner, as in the case of other personal
property, has an absolute and inherent right, as an incident of his
ownership, to sell and transfer the same at will, except insofar as
the right may be restricted by the charter of the corporation or the
general law, or by a valid by-law, or by a valid agreement between him and the corporation, provided the transfer is in good
faith, and to48 a person capable of assuming the obligations of a
shareholder.
The most common transfer restriction is that which requires that
any shareholder who wishes to sell his stock must first offer it to the
corporation's other shareholders. The use of this particular type of
restriction was sanctioned by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Taylois
Adm r v. Taylor.49 Kentucky has also recognized the right of the
shareholders in a close corporation to prearrange a particular purchase
price for stock subject to a first-option restriction.50 Despite this
judicial recognition, the strict construction placed on these types of
agreements has minimized their usefulness. 51
The old law provided generally for transfer restrictions, either
through the articles of incorporation or the by-laws.5 2 The new act
is much more specific. It declares that the articles may contain "any
provision, not inconsistent with the law, which the incorporators elect
to set forth in the articles of incorporation for the regulation of the
W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 3758 (1919).
49801 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1957).
5
0 Krebs v. McDonald's Ex'r, 266 S.W.2d (Ky. 1953). See also Brigham v.
M & J Corp., 227 N.E.2d 915 (Mass. 1967) wherein the court specifically
enforced a shareholder agreement under which the corporation bound itself upon
the death of any of its shareholders to purchase his stock at an agreed price, payable in ten equal annual installments to the deceased's estate. The court held that
the administrator of the estate could not vote the stock, sell it elsewhere, or deal
with it in any manner contrary to the agreement. And, in Bailey v. Smith, 107 So.2d
868 (Ala. 1959), the court allowed an agreement among the shareholders which
required the estate of the first to die to sell enough shares to the survivor, at tvice
value, to give him voting control.
the book
51
See Ham, The Close Corporation Under Kentucky Law, 50 Ky. L.J. 164-69
486

(1961).
52KRS § 271.035(2); KRS § 271.225. Another statute that refers specifically

to transfer restrictions is found, not in the chapter on corporations, but rather in
the one regulating commerce and trade. When Kentucky adopted the Uniform
Commercial Code, it contained a provision requiring that restrictions be noted
conspicuously on the security in order to be effective. KRS § 355.8-204.
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internal affairs of the corporation, including any provision restricting
the transfer of shares" (emphasis added). 53 Thus, the reasonable
use of transfer restrictions is another device by which Kentucky close
corporations may preserve themselves.
II. DiscuioNY

PROVISIONS

A. Classificationof Stock
Restrictions other than those placed on the transfer of shares may
be used to shape the corporation in the manner desired by its creators.
The stock may be divided into two or more classes, with each class
voting as a separate unit for various purposes, or perhaps not voting at
all.5 4 References to classification of stock are made throughout the
new Kentucky Business Corporation Act, so all of them will not be
mentioned here. This discussion will be limited to a treatment of the
provisions specifically regulating the use of stock classification.
Under the new act corporations may create and issue the number
of shares provided for in the articles. Such shares may be divided into
as many classes as desired, carrying whatever rights and limitations
are set forth in the articles. 55 The new act further provides that preferred or special classes may be divided into "series." 56 The rights and
preferences of each series within a class, however, must be identical
except with respect to dividend rates, redemption of shares, value of
shares upon liquidation, sinking fund provisions, conversion of shares,
and voting rights. The articles themselves may specifically provide
for the issuance of stock in series or they may give the board of
directors the authority to do so.5 7 A full statement of the various
rights and limitations, or a notation that such a statement will be
furnished by the corporation upon request, must be exhibited on
each certificate so issued.58
53K1ISA § 271A.27(1)(h); MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 21 § 54(h)
(1971). The language used in this statute might give rise to the question of
whether the articles can be amended to include transfer restrictions. It states
rather plainly that any provision which the incorporatorselect to set forth in the
articles is valid. However, the amendment provision of the new act appears to

include transfer restrictions among the items subject to amendment. KRSA §
271A.185( 1).
54 H. HENN, LAW OF COR OAIONS § 189.
21 § 15 (1971).
55 KRSA § 271A.075(1); MODEL Bus. CoRn'. AcT ANN.
50 KRSA § 271A.080; MODEL Bus. Corn. AcT ANN. 2 D § 16 (1971). The pro-

visions for classes and series under the old act are comparable to the new sections.
KRS § 271.155.
57KBSA § 271A.080(2); MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. 2D § 16 (1971).
Several additional filing requirements are necessary if the board creates a series.
5s KRSA § 271A.115(2); MODEL Bus. Corn'. AcT ANN. 2D § 23 (1971). The
new act is similar in this regard to the former provision. KRS § 271.265(2) (d).
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Any feature of class or series shares may be altered by amending
the articles, which ordinarily may be accomplished by the vote of a
majority of the shareholders. 59 At first glance, the provision appears
to put the stock of a minority class in jeopardy; a closer look, however,
reveals that where minority rights are involved, that particular minority
is entitled to vote as a class on the amendment. A majority of the
class affected plus a majority of all the other eligible shareholders is
thus necessary for passage of the amendment.60 In this respect the
old and new acts are quite similar. Under the old act, though, the
prerequisites for a class vote were not detailed: if the amendment
would "alter or change the preferences, special rights, or powers" of a
class "so as to affect the same adversely," or would increase the number
or decrease the value of the shares of a class, then a class vote was
required."' The new act is much more explicit; it includes ten sub-2
sections describing particular situations that require a class vote.1
The effect of both the old and new provisions, of course, is to give a
class of shareholders the power to veto disadvantageous amendments.
The new provisions should prove more useful, however, because of
63
the particularity with which the situations covered are enumerated.

Classification of stock may be used to create a number of different
64
rights and limitations among shareholders of the same corporation.
Perhaps the most common classification of stock is that between preferred and common shares. But probably the most significant type of

classification expressly authorized by the new act is that allowing non59 KRSA § 271A.290; MODEL Bus. Corn'. Ac'r ANN. 2D § 58 (1971); KRSA §

271A.295;

MODEL

Bus. Corn. Acr ANN. 2D § 59 (1971).

60KRSA § 271A.300; MODEL Bus. CoRnp. AcT ANN. 2D § 60 (1971); KRSA §

271A.295(1) (c); MODEL Bus. CoRP. Act ANN.2D § 59 (1971).

61 KRS § 271.445(3).
62 KRSA § 271A.300; MODEL Bus. CORP.Acr ANN. 2D § 60 (1971).
63 Other provisions in the new act which affect the use of classes or series are
KRSA § 271A.130; MODEL Bus. CORn. Aar ANN. 2D § 26 (1971) (pre-emptive
rights of class shareholders to acquire treasury shares); KRSA § 271A.270; MODEL
Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. 2D § 54 (1971) (provisions in the articles); KRSA §
271A.325; MODEL Bus. Corn,. Acr ANN. 2D § 65 (1971) (amendments under a
plan of reorganization); KRSA § 271A.365(2); MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 2D
§ 73 912 (1971) (merger or consolidation vote); KRSA § 271A.395(3); MODEL
Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. 2D § 79(c) (1971) (vote on transfer of corporate assets);
and KRSA § 271A.420(3); MODEL Bus. CoRP. Aar ANN. 2D § 84(c) (1971) (vote

on voluntary dissolution).
64 See generally Hatch v. Newark Tel. Co., 170 N.E. 371 (Ohio 1930),
Ellington v. Raleigh Bldg. Supply Co., 147 S.E. 307 (N.C. 1929), and Boyd v.
Boone Nat'l Bank, 218 N.W. 821 (Iowa 1928) (provisions giving liens on the
corporate assets to the preferred shareholders); Bunker Hill Country Club v.
App. 221 (1935), Murphy v. Richardson Dry Goods Co., 31
McElhatton, 282 Ill.
S.W.2d 72 (Mo. 1930), and Gipson v. Bedard, 217 N.W. 139 (Minn. 1927) (provisions giving preference to common stock); Ammon v. Cushman Motor Works,
258 N.W. 649 (Neb. 1935), Cring v. Sheller Wood Rim Mfg. Co., 183 N.E. 674
Ind. 1932), and Koeppler v. Cocker Chair Co., 228 N.W. 130 (Wisc. 1930)
(provisions for redemption of preferred stock during the life of the corporation).
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voting stock.6 5 Illinois, which has a constitutional provision on cumulative voting somewhat similar to Kentucky's, has held the use of
non-voting stock unconstitutional on the ground that it violates the
intent of that provision.6 6 The Court of Appeals of Kentucky has
upheld the use of non-voting stock in at least one instance, 67 although
the constitutional argument was not made in that case. The Court
stated that it was within the power of a corporation to provide in the
articles or stock certificates that preferred shareholders have no vote
"in the absence of constitutional or statutory provisions."6 8 Even if the
plaintiff had based his attack on Section 207 of the Constitution of
the Commonwealth of Kentucky, which requires that cumulative voting be used in the election of directors, the result would likely have
been the same. That section declares that "each shareholder shall
have the right to cast as many votes in the aggregate as he shall be
entitled to vote in said company under its charter, multiplied by the
number of directors or managers to be elected" (emphasis added).
If the articles provide that certain shareholders are not entitled to vote
at all, the Kentucky Constitution, unlike that of Illinois, appears to be
no bar to such provisions.
Stock classification is probably the most precise method by which
the members of a close corporation can structure their enterprise. The
new Kentucky Business Corporation Act seems to authorize broad
implementation of this method. 69
B. Informal Action
One of the most inconvenient principles of law with which a close
corporation must cope is that which prohibits the board of directors
from binding the corporation unless they have acted as a body. The
"board action" rule is derived from the requirement that the business
of a corporation shall be managed by a board of directors.70 With
respect to the close corporation, the rule has effectively prevented one
director of a three-man corporation, for instance, from acting without
calling a meeting and getting the formal consent of the other directormembers of the corporation. Kentucky corporations have operated
under the board action rule since 1910, when it was adopted by the
2 § 15 (1971).
65 KRSA § 271A.075; MODEL Bus. CoRp. Acr ANND.

06 SeePeople ex YreL Watseka Tel. Co. v. Emmerson, 134 N.E. 707 (Ill. 1922).
But see Miller v. Rattennan, 24 N.E. 496 (Ohio 1889).
67 WiUiams v. Davis, 180 S.W.2d 874 (Ky. 1944).
68 Id. at 876.
69 Stock classification may not always be desirable from a tax standpoint,
however. For a discussion of the Subehapter S treatment of stock classes, see Ham,
supra70note 51, at 143 n. 70.
See, e.g., KIRS § 271.845(1).
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Court of Appeals in Star Mills v. Bailey,71 and most recently reaffirmed
in Clay v. Mt. Holly Development Co. 7 2 Although the Court from
time to time has relaxed its application of the rule, 73 by far the more
satisfactory course as far as the close corporation is concerned would
be to disregard the rule entirely. The legislature attempted to do so
in 1966, when it amended the old act to allow informal board action
if the written consent of all the directors (or members of a committee,
if applicable) was obtained.7 4 One problem remained, however-such
informal action was valid only if the consent was obtained prior to
taking action. In practice, the amendment was of little help to the
close corporation, since a director who wanted to act for the corporation still had to contact the others and obtain their written consent
before he could do so. The new act is similar to the old provision
except that it includes no stipulation as to when the consent of the
directors must be obtained, 75 thus removing the last obstacle to
informal board action.
Kentucky has allowed informal action by shareholders for some
time,7 6 and the new act contains substantially the same provisions as
the old one.7 7 It is important to note that, unlike the provision for
informal action by the board of directors, the effect of this section
cannot be abrogated by the articles of incorporation or by the bylaws. 7 8 The board can eliminate its own power to act informally, but
cannot bind the shareholders to act according to formal requirements
by passing a by-law to that effect.
Along with other provisions in the new act, these sections relaxing
the traditional restrictions on corporate action are clearly tailored for
the close corporation. If properly utilized, they can help make the
day-to-day management of a small business much less complex than
in the past.
71 130 S.W. 1077 (Ky. 1910). See also Bastin v. Givens" Adm'x, 185 S.W. 835
(Ky. 1916); Paducah & Illinois Ferry Co. v. Robertson, 171 S.W. 171 (Ky. 1914);
Chilton v. Bell County Coke & Improvement Co., 156 S.W. 889 (Ky. 1913). The
Court of Appeals has allowed the board to delegate its powers to an executive
committee whose acts may be made binding on the corporation. Haldeman v.
Haldeman, 197 S.W. 376 (Ky. 1917).
72 464 S.W.2d 621 (Ky. 1971).
73 See, e.g., Slater v. Bright, 248 S.W.2d 915 (Ky. 1952); Kozy Theatre Co. v.

Love, 231 S.W. 249 (Ky. 1921).
74 KRS § 271.345(4) (e).
75 KRSA § 271A.220; MODEL
76 KRS § 271.405.
77 KRSA § 271A.665;

Bus. CORP.

AcT ANN.

2D

§ 44 U1
1 (1971).

MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 2D § 145 II2 (1971). The
new act, unlike the old, puts no limitations on the types of actions that may be

taken informally.
78 KRSA § 271A.220 begins with the phrase: "Unless otherwise provided by
the articles of incorporation or by-laws ... " KRSA § 271A.665 contains no such
language.
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C. Executive Compensation

Another area of concern in Kentucky has been executive compensation-who sets the figure and how is it paid? The problem, as
will be discussed in more detail later, was that the Court of Appeals
has long been reluctant to allow a board of directors to make a contract
for the corporation where interested directors were a part of the
quorum and voting majority that approved it.7 9 A board setting its
80
own salaries would certainly come under the heading "interested;"
in order to overcome the problem, some jurisdictions have used the
split resolution technique, wherein the salary for each director is voted
on by the other directors with the "interested" director not participating, but Kentucky has never sanctioned this method. 81 The old
provision that regulated the powers of the board of directors said
nothing specific about executive compensation.8 2 Under the new act,
however, the board is given explicit authority to fix the compensation
of directors, unless the articles provide otherwise8 The issue of who
will fix the compensation for a corporation's executives then, has been
resolved. Several questions, however, still remain. What about the
amount of compensation?-Is the board to be allowed to set whatever
sum it wishes? And what about the form of payment?-Must it always
be cash or can it be something else?
The fact that the board of directors now has explicit statutory
authority to set its own salaries does not mean that the directors will
have a free hand. Several Kentucky cases have held directors' salaries
excessive. In Beha v. Martin,8 4 for instance, the Court held that where
majority shareholders, as directors of a corporation, vote themselves
salaries, a court of equity will review the reasonableness of such
salaries upon application by a minority shareholder. If the court finds
the salaries unreasonable, it will enjoin payment and order a recovery
of the excess over a reasonable sum.80 In a close corporation, presumably, the problem of the amount of compensation should not arise too
often. Its members should be able to agree on the apportionment of
70 See note 164 infra.
80 There is a difference between a shareholder who is voting as a director

and one who is voting as a shareholder; when voting as a shareholder he has a
legal right to vote with a view toward his own benefits and represents himself only,
but as a director he represents all the shareholders as a trustee and cannot use his
offlce for his personal benefit at the shareholders' expense. The motive prompting
a shareholder s vote, however reprehensive or malicious, is not generally relevant to
judicial inquiry. See Kirwan v. Parkway Distillery, 148 S.W.2d 720 (Ky. 1941).
81 But see Beha v. Martin, 171 S.W. 393 (Ky. 1914).
82 KRS § 271.345.
83 KRSA § 271A.175; MODEL Bus. Corn'. ACT ANN. 2D § 35 (1971).
84 171 S.W. 393 (Ky. 1914).
sr See also Poutch v. Natl Foundry & Mach. Go., 143 S.W. 1003 (Ky. 1912).
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the funds available (although the Internal Revenue Service might
not). However, should a shareholder become disenchanted with the
sum the other participants are receiving, he may apply to the courts
for injunction and recovery on the ground of unreasonableness. Further, the payments complained of need not be in the form of regular
compensation. Bonuses may also be scrutinized by the courts. A
federal district court has held, in a decision under Kentucky law, that
in order for the bonus to be valid, there must be formal action by
the shareholders approving a bonus for past services, along with a
valid contract providing for such payment showing a proper relationship between the amount of the bonus and the value of the services
performed. 6 Otherwise, payment of the bonus will be considered
an unlawful dissipation of corporate assets for which the managing
officers are responsible to the corporation.
The form of executive compensation may also create difficulties.
In the close corporation, cash is not always the most desirable medium,
either in exchange for shares of stock or for compensation. There are
numerous reasons for such a situation, including the lack of readily
available funds in the initial stages of the close corporation. Also, the
participants in a close corporation may affect the methods of payment;
a father and son beginning business together might find transfers of
cash inconvenient, if not impossible. These problems have led to the
practice of using the stock itself, or some variation thereof, as compensation to the participants. The old Kentucky act sanctioned the
practice by allowing labor or property actually received to serve as
consideration for shares in the corporation, limiting the value of
the stock so issued to the market value of the labor or property at the
time it was performed or received. This allowed members of a close
corporation to contribute their time to the business and receive stock
as compensation.8 7 Since the market price was to be set by the
incorporators, shareholders, or directors, and was deemed to be prima
facie correct, the members of the corporation could usually set the
value at whatever figure they wished.8 The statute did provide that
if a person questioned the valuation and proved "by a clear preponderance of the evidence" that it should have been set differently,
then such valuation would not be considered correct on its face.8 9
The only differences between the old and new acts, in this respect, are
that the new act deletes the incorporators from the list of those who
can value the labor or property, and adds "fraud in the transaction"
88 Richardson v. Blue Grass Mining Co., 29 F. Supp. 658 (E.D. Ky. 1939).
87KRS § 271.175(1).

8

8KRS § 271.195(1).

89RS § 271.195.
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as one of the limits on the conclusiveness of the valuation. 90 Fraud is
not mentioned in the old act.91
An added provision in this area is the one specifically concerning
stock options. The new act allows the board of directors to set up
options, subject to provisions in the articles. They may be issued to
all the shareholders, solely on the authority of the board. Where they
are issued to directors, officers, or employees, and not to all the shareholders, however, a majority of the shareholders entitled to vote on
92
the question must approve or subsequently ratify such options.

The use of stock option plans for executive (and employee) compensation became popular in the 1950's and early 1960's because of
the favorable tax treatment accorded them, 3 and, although the Internal Revenue Code has tightened the requirements for qualified
options,9 4 they remain as viable alternatives to straight cash compensation. The popularity of the stock option, however, has led to a great
deal of litigation by minority shareholders testing the validity of such
arrangements. The largest single issue raised has been the necessity95
and sufficiency" of the consideration offered for the option. Generally,
90 KRSA § 271A.095. The new Kentucky provision differs from the Model Act
on one point. The Model section merely states that in the absence of fraud the
judgement of the board of directors or shareholders shall be conclusive. MODEL
Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 2n § 19 (1971). Kentucky retains its old provision allowing
a person to prove that the valuation should have been otherwise.
91 There are limits on this type of compensation, too. In Louisville Bldg. Ass'n
v. Hegan, 49 S.W. 796 (Ky. 1899), the Court held that a director who claimed
commissions on the sale of land for the corporation could not collect where he
allowed the board to close the transactions believing that they would have to pay
nothing further. The case of Paducah Land, Coal & Iron Co. v. Mulholland, 24
S.W. 624 (Ky. 1894), presented an even more dubious situation. There, the
directors purchased land for the corporation from one of their number and agreed
to give him ten thousand shares of the corporation's stock as compensation. Under
a prior arrangement with him, however, forty-five hundred of the shares were
returned to the other directors for their personal benefit The Court, in surprisingly
mild terms held that the forty-five hundred shares should be surrendered for cancellation,
if not in the hands of bona fide purchasers for value.
92
KRSA § 271A.100; MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. 2D § 20 (1971). This
section could have the effect of lessening the scope of the provision in KRSA §
271A.095 wherein a person could question the valuation of the consideration for
stock on grounds other than fraud. Under KRSA § 271A.100, the judgment of
the board (not the shareholders, too, as in KRSA § 271A.095) with regard to the
value of consideration offered for stock options shall be conclusive, absent a
showing of fraud. Perhaps the fact that the shareholders must vote on options
that are not issued to everyone is considered a sufficient safeguard against abuse
of director
discretion.
93
See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, H8 421-25.
94 Id.
95

See Holthusen v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 52 F. Supp. 125 (E.D. Pa.
1943) and Scheinman v. Natl Container Corp., 165 Misc. 267, 300 N.Y.S. 780
(Sup. Ct. 1939). But see Leech v. Fuller, 173 Misc. 543, 19 N.Y.S. 2d 98 (Sup. Ct.
1939).90
See Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 90 A.2d 660 (Del. 1952) and Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corp., 60 A.2d 106 (Del. 1948).
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granting an option to an officer or employee merely to provide him

with extra incentive while carrying out his duties has not been considered sufficient consideration.9 7 On the other hand, issuing an
option to obtain or retain the services of personnel whose talents were
needed for the success of the corporation has usually been considered
valid.9 8 Where the directors have acted in good faith, and there is
no fraud or waste of assets, the courts rarely inquire into the reasonableness of the valuation of the services offered as consideration. 99 As

with other types of compensation, however, the board does not have a
free hand; mere "good faith" is not always enough. A court may
question the sufficiency of the relationship between the value of the

option and the value of the services obtained, even when the directors
have acted in good faith. In Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp.,10 0
a Delaware court held that the directors had to prove not only their
good faith, but also that the fairness of the transaction would with-

stand an objective, penetrating analysis.101 This rationale, were it
adopted by other jurisdictions, would appear to subject any and all
option plans to the scrutiny of the courts.
Assurance that the employee receiving the option will continue in
the employment of the corporation 02 and self-dealing among the
directors' 0 3 are other issues raised by shareholders regarding stock

options. It has generally been held that the corporation must be
assured of the employee's services for a substantial time (at least
for the period covered by the option) by the terms of the option or by
other circumstances. In recent cases, however, the courts appear to be
placing less emphasis on this requirement. In Elster v. Beard, 0 4 an
Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corp., 60 A.2d 106 (Del. 1948).
See Wise v. Universal Corp., 93 F. Supp. 393 (D. Del. 1950); Wyles v.
Campbell, 77 F. Supp. 343 (D. Del. 1948); McQuillen v. Nat'l Cash Register Co.,
27 F. Supp. 639 (D. Md. 1939); Diamond v. Davis, 38 N.Y.S.2d 103 (Sup. Ct.
1942); Abrams v. Allen, 36 N.Y.S.2d 174 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
09 See cases cited in note 98 supra. A court of equity will not substitute its
97

98

judgment as to internal management of a corporation at the instance of the
minority shareholders, unless the actions complained of are so clearly against the
interests of the minority as to wantonly destroy their rights and to constitute a
clear violation thereof. Rice v. Thomas, 211 S.W. 428 (Ky. 1919).
100 90 A.2d 660 (Del. 1952), motion for rehearing granted, 91 A.2d 57 (Del.
1952), aff'd, 92 A.2d 594 (Del. 1952), new trial, 99 A.2d 507 (Del. Ch. 1953).
10190 A.2d 660, 663 (Del. 1952).
.02 See Clamitz v. Thatcher Mfg. Co., 158 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 331 U.S. 825 (1947); Wyles v. Campbell, 77 F. Supp. 343 (D. Del. 1948);
Holthusen v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 52 F. Supp. 125 (E.D. Pa. 1943); Elster
v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 100 A.2d 219 (Del. Ch. 1953); Eliasberg v. Standard Oil Co.,
92 A.2d 862 (N.J. Super. 1952); Kaufman v. Schoenberg, 91 A.2d 786 (Del. Ch.
1952); Kerbs v. California E. Airways, Inc., 90 A.2d 652 (Del. 1952).
103 See Wise v. Universal Corp., 93 F. Supp. 393 (D. Del. 1950); Rogers v.
Guar. Trust Co., 60 F.2d 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1932); Kaufman v. Schoenberg, 91 A.2d
786 (Del. Ch. 1952); Diamond v. Davis, 38 N.Y.S.2d 103 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
104 160 A.2d 731 (Del. Ch. 1960).
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option that was immediately exercisable was upheld even though it
contained no assurance that the employee would continue with the
corporation. The court gave lip service to the general rule noted
above, and then declared the option valid because it was created by a
disinterested board and ratified by the shareholders. 0 5 The trend in
this area, then, is toward allowing the directors wide latitude in the
actual formation of stock options. 10 6 This in turn can lead to selfdealing among the directors, and, since the directors are usually able
to obtain the approval of a majority of the shareholders, relief for
director self-aggrandizement will be rare. Ratification by the shareholders places the burden of proving bad faith on the plaintiff; 10 7 in
all cases, minority shareholders raising objections to the stock option
plans have a great deal to overcome.
III. FuNDAMNTAL PRovIsioNs
A. Minority Rights and Representation

Perhaps the most pervasive aspect of Kentucky's new corporation
law is its meticulous attention to the rights of minority shareholders.

Throughout the act, specific, detailed provisions prevent majority
shareholders from riding roughshod over the minority. Although possibly of no practical value to the one or two-man close corporation,
the sections on cumulative voting, 0 8 number 0 9 and classes" 0 of directors, vacancies on the board,"' removal of directors," 2 and shareholder
dissent" 3 could be significant to close corporations with several participants. Throughout this discussion it should be remembered that
both the old and new acts require only a majority vote to amend the
114
articles, unless a higher vote is provided in the articles themselves.
105 Id. at 738.
106 See also Olson Bros. v. Englehart, 211 A.2d 610 (Del. 1965), aff'd, 245

A.2d 166
(Del. 1968) and Stemerman v. Ackerman, 184 A.2d 28 (Del. 1962).
10 7 See Kaufman v. Schoenberg, 91 A.2d 786 (Del. Ch. 1952). In order to
ratify a stock option plan, the shareholders must be properly informed of the
details. Kerbs v. California E. Airways, Inc., 91 A.2d 652 (Del. 1952). And if no
consideration is involved, unanimous shareholder approval will be necessary to
ratify the option. Cottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 90 A.2d 660 (Del. 1952);
Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corp., 60 A.2d 106 (Del. 1948). 2
108 KRSA § 271A.165(4); MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. D § 33 (1971).
109 KRSA § 271A.180 and KRSA § 271A.270(j); MODEL Bus. Corn. AcT ANN.
2D § 36 (1971) and MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 2D § 54(j)
(1971).
110 KRSA § 271A.185; MODEL Bus. CoRn'. Acr ANN. 2 D § 37 (1971).
111KRSA § 271A.190; MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 2D § 37 (1971).
112 KRSA § 271A.195; MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 2D § 39 (1971).
"3 KRSA § 271A.400 and KRSA § 271A.405; MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 2D
§ 80 (1971) and MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 2D § 81 (1971).
114 In an early Kentucky case, the Court held that every shareholder contracts
that the will of the majority shall govern in all matters coming within the limits
of the act of incorporation. Dudley v. Kentucky High School, 72 Ky. (9 Bush) 576
(1873).
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Kentucky is one of several jurisdictions that has a constitutional
provision guaranteeing the right of cumulative voting.1 1 5 This procedure, which applies only to the election of directors, gives each
share as many votes as there are directors to be elected, and permits
116
the shareholder to distribute those votes in any way he chooses.
Cumulative voting was conceived to give minority shareholders access
to the board of directors. Besides the constitutional provision, Kentucky's old corporation law had a section calling for cumulative voting 1 17 similar to the provisions of the new act. 118 The only difference
is that the new act specifically states that the cumulative votes may be
cast "in person or by proxy" while the old act merely stated that
"shareholders" shall cast the votes. 119
Over the years, ingenious majority shareholders have developed
a number of ploys whereby the purpose of the cumulative voting
process (i.e., to give minority shareholders representation on the board
of directors) has been circumvented. Changing the number of directors, classifying the board, and filling board positions occurring through
vacancy, removal, or an increase in directors, are examples of such
methods. Under the new act, the number of directors may be increased
or decreased by amending the articles or by-laws, whichever is originally used to fix that number, or by using some other procedure set
out in the articles or by-laws. 120 However, no decrease in the number
may be used to shorten the terms of an incumbent director;' 2' in other
words, majority directors cannot circumvent the required removal
procedure by decreasing the number of directors. The old act was not
115 KY.CONST. § 207.
116 H. HENN, LAw OF

COn1oRATiONs § 189.

117 KRS § 271.815(2). In Proctor Coal Co. v. Finley, 33 S.W. 188 (Ky. 1895),

the Court of Appeals first recognized the validity of the cumulative voting provisions.
118 KRSA § 271A.165(4); MODEL Bus. CoRn'. AC ANN. 2D § 33 (1971).
119 The other section of the new act having to do with selection of directors is
KRSA § 271A.270(j), providing for the composition of the initial board of
directors. MODEL Bus. CORP. Aar ANN. 2D § 54(j) (1971). The old act was quite
similar to the new provision, the only difference being that it did not require the
initial directors to actually be named. KRS § 271.035.
120 KRSA § 271A.180; MODEL Bus. ConP. AcT ANN. 2D § 36 (1971). Where
the articles provide for one number of directors and the by-laws another, the articles
prevail. In re Salnor Realty Corp., 16 Misc.2d 189, 183 N.Y.S.2d 879 (Sup. Ct.
1959). And where the by-laws set forth the number of directors and the shareholders elect more, the election is irregular and voidable. In re Multifade Corp.
of America, 97 N.Y.S.2d 609 (Sup. Ct. 1950). But, where the shareholders elect
fewer directors than called for by the by-laws, the election is valid as to the directors
chosen. State ex rel. Price v. DuBrul, 126 N.E. 87 (Ohio 1919); Great Falls &
Teton County Ry. v. Ganong, 136 P. 891 (Mont. 1913); Wright v. Commonwealth,
1 A. 794 (Pa. 1885). And it has been held that where candidates for a nine-man
board tied for ninth place, the directorship was vacant. Grip v. Burrdlen Woodworking Co., 437 P.2d 915 (Wash. 1968).
121 KRSA § 271A.180; MODEL Bus. Con'. AcT ANN.2D § 36 (1971).
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so solicitous of minority rights; it allowed a majority of the shareholders
to increase or decrease the number of directors without regard to
whether or not incumbents representing minority shareholders would
be removed thereby. 122 This, of course, could completely destroy the
effect of cumulative voting-if the number were increased the minority's
power was diluted; if the number were decreased their power may
have been removed altogether.
In regard to classification of directors, the old act provided that
the terms of office of the individual directors could be staggered, and
that the terms were to be arranged so that "the terms of an equal or
nearly equal number of directors [would] expire each year."123 This
provision apparently applied to boards with any number of directors,
and, absent other provisions in the articles or by-laws, 124 gave majority
shareholders the power to manipulate the terms of all directors, regardless of whom the directors represented on the board. Under the new
act, there will be no classification of directors in most close corporations, since only a board of directors that consists of nine or more
members may be classified. 125 However, even a board which is large
enough to be classified may run into constitutional difficulties. Some
jurisdictions whose constitutions require cumulative voting prohibit
classification of directors because it interferes with the shareholders'
voting rights. In Wolfson v. Avery, 26 a provision on director classification similar to that of the Model Act was held unconstitutional as
inconsistent with Illinois' guarantee of cumulative voting. Kentucky's
constitutional provision on cumulative voting is similar to that of
Illinois, 127 and therefore the validity of the new provision on classification is questionable. On the other hand, Pennsylvania, whose constitution also requires cumulative voting, has held that the classification of
directors with staggered terms is not inconsistent with the cumulative
voting right. 28 Even if the Kentucky Court of Appeals agrees with
122 KRS § 271.345(4). It does appear, however, that unanimous consent of the
shareholders to amend the articles or by-laws could have been required, thus
preserving the minority voice on the board. KBS § 271.445(2) and KRS §
271.315(7).
123 KRS § 271.345(4).
12 4 See note 122 supra.
125 KRSA § 271A.185; MoDEL Bus. CoRp. Aar ANN. 2D § 37 (1971). In
Humphreys v. Winous, 133 N.E.2d 780 (Ohio 1956), a board composed of only
three directors was divided into three classes. As a consequence, the holder of
forty per cent of the shares was unable to elect a single director, even though he
had cumulative voting rights. The Ohio court upheld the classification, but did so
with the knowledge that the Ohio legislature had amended the corporation
statute so as to provide that in the future no class could consist of less than three
directors.
120 126 N.E.2d 701 (IiI. 1955).
12 7

KY. CONST. § 207.
12 8 Janney v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 128 A.2d 76 (Pa. 1956).
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the Pennsylvania court, if and when the question is raised, the new act
still circumscribes the power of the majority directors to some extent.
The new provision authorizing director classification is much stricter
than the one in the old act.1 29 It provides (1) that the number of
directors in each class must be "as nearly equal as possible," (2) that
classes shall be staggered by a prescribed method, and (3) that any
classification of directors before the first annual meeting shall not be
effective. If classification is allowed in Kentucky, abuse of minority
shareholders should still be held to a minimum.
The old Kentucky act had no provisions relating to the removal of
directors. Since shareholders have generally been accorded the right
to remove a director for cause, 130 and may adopt provisions in the
articles or by-laws allowing removal without cause, 131 majority shareholders could avoid the effect of cumulative voting through the removal
power.132 Under the new act the power of removal is broad, but the
procedure required to implement it is defined in such a manner as
to preserve the rights of minority shareholders. At a shareholders'
meeting called for the express purpose of removing directors, any or
all of the directors may be removed, with or without cause, by a
33
majority of the shares entitled to vote at an election of directors.
But, unless the entire board is to be removed, no single director can
be removed if the votes against his removal would be sufficient to
elect him if voted cumulatively at an election of the entire board.Y34
Therefore, if a minority faction is able to attract enough votes to elect
a director, that director cannot be removed without the acquiescense
of part of that faction. The new act appears to effectively safeguard
the intent of the cumulative voting provision from obliteration through
13 5
the removal power.
Once a vacancy occurs, of course, whether through removal or
.29 KRSA

§ 271A.185; MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN.2D § 37 (1971); KRS §

271.345(4).

130 See Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 134 A.2d 852 (Del. Ch. 1957).

131 See H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 185 (rev. ed. 1946); R. STEVENs,
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 163 (2d ed. 1949).
132

See Laughlin v. Greer, 121 IM.App. 534 (1905).

133 KRSA § 271A.195(1); MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN.2D § 39 (1971).
134KRSA § 271A.195(2); MODEL Bus. CORP. Act ANN. 2D § 39 (1971).

If

there are classes of directors, only those shareholders who elect the particular class
may remove a director of that class. KRSA § 271A.195(3); MODEL Bus. CORP.
AcT ANN.2D § 39 (1971).

135 Removal of officers, however, is a different matter. The new act provides
that officers or agents may be removed by the board whenever the board thinks
such an action would be in the "best interests" of the corporation, such removal
not to prejudice any contract rights of the person removed. In O'Neal v. F. A.
Weider Co., 80 S.W. 451 (Ky. 1904), the Court held that directors have the right
to discharge an officer at any time, without cause, in the absence of a contract
which guarantees that the officer is entitled to hold his office for a definite period.
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death or resignation, the tyranny of the majority must be borne by
the minority, for a time at least. The practical effect of both the old
and new acts is to give the majority of directors the right to fill the
unexpired term. 3 6 However, the new act does place restrictions on
vacancies created due to an increase in the number of directors. Such
"vacancies" may be filled only for a term of office continuing to the

next election of directors by the shareholders. 137 This permits minority
shareholders to exercise their cumulative voting privileges within a
relatively short time after the new positions are created and gives them
a chance to elect members of their own faction to the additional seats
13 8
on the board.
If, despite all these checks on the corporation's majority faction, it
still manages to commit the corporation to a course completely contrary to the wishes of the minority, the minority for the most part must
grin and bear it. There are two exceptions to this general rule-where
the corporation adopts a plan of merger or consolidation and where
it disposes of all or most of its property and assets not "in the usual
and regular course of business," any shareholder may "dissent."13 9 The

old act provided for shareholder dissent in these situations, 140 but there

are a number of differences between the two in regard to implementing
the dissent provisions. In these instances, "dissent" means that the
shareholder wishes to surrender his shares of stock to the corporation
in exchange for cash representing the "fair value" thereoL 4 1 Under
both the old and new acts the shareholder is required to follow certain
136 KRS § 271.345(4) (a); KRSA § 271A.190; MODEL Bus. Corn. AcT ANN. 2D
§ 38 (1971). The only difference between the two acts is that the old act required
the sanction of the shareholders. In Stott v. Stott Realty Co., 224 N.W. 623 (Mich.
1929), the court held that the authority to fill vacancies did not permit the board
to create vacancies by removal of directors.
.37 KRSA § 271A.190; MODEL Bus. CornP. ACT ANN. 2D § 38 (1971). In In re
A. A. Griffing Iron Co., 41 A. 931 (N.J. 1898), aff'd, 46 A. 1097 (N.J. 1899), the
court held that the board did not have the power, under a statute allowing them to
fill vacancies, to fill newly-created directorships. Other cases have held that
"vacancy" implies a previous incumbency. Gow v. Consol. Coppermines Corp.,
165 A. 136 (Del. 1933); McWhirten v. Washington Royalties Co., 152 A. 220 (Del.
1930); Moon v. Moon Motor Car Co., 151 A. 298 (Del. 1930).
138 And, it has been held that directors could not appoint others to fill directorships that were not newly-created, but had just never been filled by the shareholders. Belle Isle Corp. v. MacBean, 61 A.2d 699 (Del. 1948).
139 KRSA § 271A.400; MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2D § 80 (1971).
140 KRS § 271.415(4) and KRS § 271.490.
141 In Corwin v. Shelter Island Light & Power Co., 199 N.Y.S.2d 866 (Sup. Ct.
1960), the court held that the right of a dissenter to appraisal of his shares was
not absolute, but discretionary with the court, and should not be used either as an
offensive weapon against the corporation or as the cause of unwarranted expense
to the majority shareholders. And, where shareholders sought to examine the
corporation's ledgers because this was the only way to obtain the prices paid for
stock, the fact that they had sued to recover the fair market value of their stock
did not constitute a waiver of their right to examine the corporation's books.
E.I.F.C., Inc. v. Atnip, 454 S.W.2d 351 (Ky. 1970).
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procedures. Both acts require that the shareholder object to the action
to be taken in writing; the old act required that such objections be
made prior to the vote 142 whereas the new act also allows the shareholder to object at the meeting. 143 Further, under the old act, unlike
the new, the shareholder had to elect between claiming payment for
44
his shares and filing suit for a fraudulent or illegal corporate action.
Finally, the value of all dissenting shares had to be determined in one
suit (if such a suit were necessary) under the old act;1 45 no mention
is made of consolidating shareholders' actions in the new act. These
dissent provisions are probably more important to the close corporation
than to public issue corporations. A shareholder who owns one-third
of the stock of a corporation and finds himself outvoted on a merger
or transfer of assets may utilize these provisions to withdraw from
the venture.
B. High Vote/High Quorum Requirements
Another method which minority shareholders have employed to
protect their interests is a requirement that quorums and votes at both
shareholder and board meetings be greater than a simple majority.
These provisions usually allow the minority to veto actions which the
majority may desire; that, in turn, enhances the likelihood of deadlock
and possible dissolution. 146 The new act makes several changes in the
availability of high quorum/high vote provisions. Both the old and
new acts require that a majority of the shareholders entitled to vote be
present to constitute a quorum, unless provided otherwise in the
articles,' 47 but the section dealing with quorums at board meetings
has been altered and clarified. Under the old act, a majority of the
board of directors was needed for a quorum unless the by-laws
required a different number. 148 This provision allowed the corporation
to raise or lower its quorum requirement for board meetings easily,
but it was unclear whether or not such changes could be made by the
142 KRS § 271.415(4) (a); KRS § 271.490(1).
143KRSA § 271A.405(1); MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr AN . 29 § 81 (1971).
144KRS § 271.415(4)(b); KRS § 271.490(1).
145KRS § 271.415 (4) (d); KRS § 271.490 (1).
146H. HENN, LAW OF COR'ORATroNs § 266.
147KRSA § 271A.160(1); MODEL Bus. Corn'. ACT ANN. 2 § 32 (1971); KRS
§ 271.835(2)(a). The new act adds: "but in no event shall a quorum consist of
less than one-third of the shares entitled to vote at the meeting." It has been held
that, for quorum purposes and shareholder action, shares entitled to vote are those
which are actually issued and outstanding and not the total number of shares
authorized. Castner v. Twitchell-Chanplin Co., 40 A. 558 (Me. 1898).
148KRS § 271.345(4) (c). A quorum could never be less than one-third the
total number of directors nor less than two directors.
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articles as well as the by-laws. 149 The new act states that a quorum
at a meeting of the board of directors shall be a majority of the directors, unless a greater number is called for in the by-laws or the
articles. 5 0 Thus the new provision solves any procedural questions
that may have existed, and prohibits lowering of quorum require51
ments.
Vote requirements have been substantially changed by the new
act. The provision in the old statute, which apparently controlled the
voting requisites for shareholder action, stated that the articles or
by-laws could specify the votes necessary for the transaction of
business, except in actions controlled by the statute.

52

Like the

quorum requirement, then, the vote requirements could be fixed at
more or less than a majority. Further, there was no statutory authority
to prevent the shareholders from requiring a unanimous vote if they
so desired. 15 3 The new act allows the vote requirement for shareholder
action to be raised, but it cannot be lowered.154 The new act also
retains the old provision, not found in the Model Business Corporation
Act; which authorizes the remaining shareholders to act when others
withdraw, causing the number present to fall below the quorum
requirement. 15 5 Both the old and the new act provide that a majority
vote of the shareholders is necessary before certain actions may be
taken' 56 and that if the articles require a greater vote than the statute,
149 For a more detailed discussion of these problems, see Ham, supra note 51,
at 162.
'5oKRSA § 271A.200; MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. 2D § 40 (1971). Where
the by-laws stated that a majority of the directors should constitute a quorum,
and there were vacancies on the board at the time, only a majority of the
authorized directors was necessary. Currie v. Matson, 33 F. Supp. 454 (W.D. La.
1940); Bruch v. Nat'l Guarantee Credit Corp., 116 A. 738 (Del. Ch. 1922);
Burton v. Lithic Mfg. Co., 144 P. 1149 (Ore. 1914).
151 In a case where the shareholders adopted a resolution increasing the
number of directors from five to nine, but no actual change in the number who
served ever occurred, the number of directors remained at three for quorum
purposes. Robertson v. Hartman, 57 P.2d 1310 (Cal. 1936).
152KRS § 271.315(7).
153 For a discussion of this possibility, see Ham, supra note 51, at 157.
154 KRSA § 271A.160(1); MODEL Bus. Cor'p. Acr ANN. 2n § 32 (1971).
155 KRSA § 271A.160(1); KRS § 271.335(2) (b). But, a shareholder present
in person or by a proxy before a quorum is present may withdraw, and his original
presence cannot be counted for quorum purposes after he leaves. Textron, Inc.,
v. Am. Woolen Co., 122 F. Supp. 305 (D. Mass. 1954). Where a person who
holds shares and proxies is ejected from a meeting for objecting to the legality of
the meeting, his shares cannot be counted when determining a quorum and the
election of directors at the meeting is void for lack of a quorum. Leamy v. Sinaloa
Exploration &Dev. Co., 130 A. 282 (Del. Ch. 1925).
156 KRSA § 271A.295(1)(c); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr ANN. 2 D § 59 (1971);
KRS § 271.445(2) (amending the articles). KRSA § 271A.345(1)(c); MODEL Bus.
CORP. Acr ANN. 2D § 69 (1971); KRS § 271.460(1) (reduction of capital). KRSA
§ 271A.395(3); MODEL Bus. Cornp. ACT ANN. 2D § 79 (1971); KRS § 271.415(2)
(Continued on next page)
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the articles control.' 57 The new act, however, changes the procedure
for approval of merger and consolidation. Apparently, under the old
act, only a majority of the shareholders was necessary for approval; 5 8
the articles could not raise the requirement. Under the new provisions,
the vote required for merger or consolidation can be changed by the
articles.' 59 An additional feature of the new act allows a merger with
another corporation on approval of the board of directors, and not the
shareholders, if 90% of the stock of the constituent corporations is
already owned by the surviving corporation. 60
Vote requirements for board action have also been changed, to the
benefit of the minority shareholders. The old act declared that the
vote of a simple majority of the directors present would constitute
the act of the board of directors;' 6' the new act provides that such
actions require the vote of a majority of those present, unless a greater
number is required by the articles or by-laws.' 6 2 One other new provision concerning actions of the board of directors allows directors
who are interested in an action to be taken by the board to be counted
when determining the presence of a quorum. 6 3 And although not as
explicit as the quorum provision, this provision apparently allows
interested directors to vote on the action. 164 The Kentucky courts have
long held the opposite view.165
One final area wherein changes have been made in the requisite
number of directors for a quorum at a board meeting is that concerning
(Footnote continued Trom preceding page)

(transfer of corporate assets). KRSA § 271A.420(3); MODEL Bus. Cor. Acr ANN.
2D § 84 (1971); KRS § 271.500 (voluntary dissolution). Both acts allow revocation

of voluntary dissolution proceedings by all the shareholders or by act of the
corporation, in which case a majority vote is required. KRSA §§ 271A.440271A.445 inclusive; MODEL Bus. Corn'. AcT ANN. 2D §§ 88, 89(c) (1971); KRS §
271.520.
157 KRSA § 271A.655; MODEL Bus. CORP. Aar ANN. 2D § 143 (1971); KRS
§§ 271.415(2), 271.445(2), 271.460(1) and 271.500.
158 KRS § 271.470.
159 KRSA §§ 271A.865(2), 271A.655; MODEL Bus. CoRn'. AcT ANN. 2 § 73 ff2
(1971); MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 2D § 148 (1971).
16OKRSA § 271A.375(1); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr ANN. 2i § 75 (1971).
161 KRS § 271.845(c). Though not explicitly stated, the old act may have
been just as flexible in this regard as is the new act. KRS § 271.345(4).
162 KRSA § 271A.200; MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 2D § 40 (1971).
163 KRSA § 271A.205(2); MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 2D § 41 (1971).
164 KRSA § 271A.205(1); MODEL Bus. Corn. AcT ANN. 2D § 41 (1971). As a
general rule, a director personally interested in a particular matter is disqualified
from voting on it, and his vote cannot be counted in determining whether a
resolution was passed by a majority of the board. Holcomb v. Forsyth, 113 So. 516
(Ala. 1927); Jones v. Morrison, 16 N.W. 854 (Minn. 1883). But see South Georgia
Holding Co. v. Hiatt, 2 F. Supp. 91 (M.D. Ga. 1933); Wheelen v. Pullman Iron &
Steel Co., 82 N.E. 420 (Ill. 1892).
165 See Ham, supra note 51, at 194 n. 260.
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emergency by-laws to be operative in case of nuclear attack or some
similar trouble. 6 6 The applicable sections provide that the board may
adopt emergency by-laws which shall control in such situations, notwithstanding provisions in the articles or regular by-laws, and specifically set out certain areas upon which these by-laws may touch.
These include (1) quorums for board meetings-apparently a quorum
can be any number set forth in the emergency by-laws, and if no
specific number is called for, it may be whatever number of directors
attend a meeting called during the emergency 6 7 and (2) identity of
directors-officers or other designated persons may be deemed directors
to the extent necessary to provide a quorum as called for by the
emergency by-laws.'6 8 If not otherwise provided in the emergency
by-laws, certain officers shall be deemed directors to the extent necessary to obtain a quorum.16 9
High quorum/high vote requirements are specific checks on the
majority directors and shareholders. If proper provision is made, a
single member of the corporation can exert his will against that of all
the other members. And, whether for good or bad, a frequent result
is deadlock and dissolution.
C. Deadlock and Dissolution
In close corporations, the possibility of deadlock due to evenlydivided directors or shareholders or veto arrangements, 170 is much
greater than in the public issue corporations, chiefly because the close
corporation has fewer participants. The problems of deadlock and
dissolution, therefore, are critical ones which must be carefully considered by small groups contemplating incorporation. Like the old
act, the new one provides for dissolution. The statutes concerning
voluntary dissolution are similar, but the new act contains several
important differences, some of which appear to make it easier to
dissolve and others which may make it more difficult. Under the old
act, dissolution by the incorporators had to take place within one
171
year from the date of the issuance of the certificate of incorporation.
Further, all the incorporators had to agree that the corporation be dis2
D § 27A (1971).
166KRSA § 271A.135(2); MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN.
There were no comparable provisions in the old Kentucky act.
167 KRSA § 271A.135(2) (b); MODEL Bus. Corp. Acr ANN. 2D § 27A (1971).

16s KRSA § 271A.135(2) (c); MODEL Bus. CoRP. AcT ANN. 2D § 27A (1971).
169 KRSA § 271A.135(7); MODEL Bus. CoRP. AcT ANN. 2D § 27A (1971).
170 See note 146 supra, and accompanying text. See also Ham, Suggestions for

Modernizing the Kentucky General CorporationLaw to Meet the Needs of Close
Corporations,52 Ky. L.J. 527, 562 (1963).
'7' KRS § 271.495.
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solved..7 2 The new act has no time limit and requires that only a
majority of the incorporators need agree on dissolution. 173
There are similar differences in the provisions for dissolution by
the shareholders; only here the new act appears to make dissolution
more difficult. The old act allowed dissolution upon the written consent of the holders of the total voting power. 74 Holders of shares with
no voting power did not have to be consulted. Under the new act,
the written consent of all of the shareholders is necessary for dissolution. 7 5 Thus, though perhaps more solicitous of the rights of
minority (non-voting) shareholders, this particular provision creates
a greater chance of deadlock. 176
As far as voluntary dissolution by act of the corporation is concerned, the old and new acts are substantially the same. Each requires
a resolution by the board of directors and the approval of a majority
of the shareholders entitled to vote. 77 And, just as the corporation
may be voluntarily dissolved, so may the dissolution proceedings be
voluntarily revoked. The new act is comparable to the old one in this

regard.' 7 8
While the sections in the old and new acts involving voluntary
dissolution are similar, those governing involuntary dissolution are
vastly different. Kentucky did not even have a statute dealing with
involuntary dissolution in cases of deadlock prior to 1952, and the one
enacted then has been of little solace to corporate practitioners. It
made the dissolution discretionary with the circuit courts and was
unclear as to what situations were covered. 179 The new act is a great
deal more detailed and inclusive.
The new statute is framed in terms of the parties who may bring
action for liquidation-shareholders, creditors, the Attorney General,
172 KRS § 271.495(1) (g).
173 KRSA § 271A.410; MODEL Bus. CORP. Aar ANN. 2D § 82 (1971).
174 KRS § 271.500.
175 KRSA § 271A.415(1); MODEL Bus. Corn. Acr ANN. 2D § 83 (1971). In
Boyd v. Boone Nat'l Bank, 218 N.W. 321 (Iowa 1928), it was held that a preferred
shareholder had no legal interest in the continuation of the corporation, provided
his right of priority to the assets was protected. Thus, he could not object to the
dissolution of the corporation, even though all the shareholders did not agree to it.
176 When they do dissolve a corporation, the shareholders must have a
legitimate reason for doing so. In W.P. Iverson & Co. v. Dunham Mfg. Co., 152
N.E.2d 615 (IM. 1958), the court held that if shareholder-officers dissolve a corporation to prevent it from performing its contract, they must pay damages to the
other contracting
parties.
177 KRSA § 271A.420; MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. 2D § 84 (1971); KBS §
271.500.
17' KRSA §§ 271A.440-271A.445 inclusive; MODEL Bus. Conp. AcT ANN. 2D
§§ 88-89 (1971); KRS §§ 271.525-271.535 inclusive.
179 KRS § 271.570(2). For a detailed discussion of the problems involved
with this statute, see Ham, supra note 51, at 173.
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or the corporation itself (when it has already begun voluntary dissolution proceedings )-and gives the circuit courts "full power to
liquidate the assets and business of a corporation" in specific situations. 8 0 When a shareholder is seeking liquidation, it must be established: (1) that the directors and shareholders are deadlocked, and
that such deadlock is causing, or threatening to cause, "irreparable
injury" to the corporation; (2) that the acts of the directors or those
in control are fraudulent or illegal; or (3) that the shareholders are
deadlocked and have been unable to elect successors to directors at two
consecutive annual meetings.'"' When a creditor is seeking liquidation
it must be established that the corporation is insolvent and that the
creditor's claim against the corporation has been reduced to a judgement and execution is unsatisfied, or that the corporation has admitted
its debt in writing. 8 2 The Attorney General may seek liquidation after
he has filed an action to revoke or forfeit a corporation's charter and
established that liquidation should precede the decree of revocation
or forfeiture. 8 3 When the liquidation has been completed the court

shall enter a decree dissolving the corporation. 8

4

180 KRSA § 271A.475; MODEL Bus. Com-. AcT ANN. 2D § 97 (1971). There
is some authority for the assertion that where the dissolution procedures are not
fully complied with, the court does not have jurisdiction, and any dissolution order
obtained must be set aside. In re Packer City Tire & Rubber Co., 162 N.W. 897
(S.D. 1917).
181 KRSA § 271A.475(1) (a). The Kentucky act does not include the Model
Act provision that a shareholder is entitled to liquidation if he establishes that the
coilorate assets are being wasted or misappropriated. MODEL Bus. CoRP. AcT ANN.
2D 9 97 (1971). Kentucky also omits the word "oppressive," referring to acts of the
directors, from the Model Act language.
182 KRSA § 271A.475( 1) (b); MODEL Bus. Conp. AcT ANN. 2D § 97(b) (1971).
A corporation whose assets are insufficient to pay its debts, and which has ceased to
do business, or has taken or is about to take action which will incapacitate it
from conducting a corporate enterprise with a reasonable prospect of success, or
is so financially embarrassed that early suspension and failure must ensue, is as a
matter of law "insolvent." Oscar C. Wright Co. v. Steenman, 71 S.W.2d 991 (Ky.
1934). A conveyance by a corporation, when it is insolvent and has suspended its
ordinary business because of lack of funds, is void, not voidable. Ciba Co. v. Interstate Tanning Co. 9 F.2d 632 (D.N.J. 1925). But, a conveyance by a corporation
cannot be invalidated as in fraud of creditors, even though the corporation is
insolvent, as long as it has not suspended its ordinary business and the transferee,
purchasing for valuable consideration, had no notice of the insolvency. Chesher v.
Shafter Lake Clay Co., 115 P.2d 636 (N.M. 1941). And where shareholders
divide and convert to their own use corporate assets without paying the corporation's debts, those shareholders must respond personally to the creditors to the
extent of the corporate assets wrongfully received. Wallace & Tiernan Co. v. Davis,
11 S.W.2d 990 (Ky. 1928); Martin v. Lexington, 210 S.W. 483 (Ky. 1919).
'83 KRSA §§ 271A.470, 271A.475(1) (d); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr ANN. 2D §§
94, 97(d). Forfeiture of the charter of a private commercial corporation must rest
upon grave cause and be warranted by material misconduct. Commonwealth v.
United Warehouse Co., 169 S.W.2d 300 (Ky. 1943).
184 KRSA § 271A.500; MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr ANN. 2n § 102 (1971). The
corporate existence is not always ended by the dissolution (Continued
decree. Aoncorporation
next page)
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As noted before, the new provision on liquidation and dissolution
are detailed and inclusive. However, should the shareholders of the
close corporation wish to avoid the formal dissolution procedure provided by the statute, they still have the old remedies of arbitration'8 5
and buy-out agreements, 86 plus the new possibilities of the shareholder
87
agreement.
CONCLUSION

The close corporation can no longer be considered the step-child
of the multi-level conglomerate. With the adoption of the new Kentucky Business Corporation Act, the General Assembly has signalled
its full acceptance of the concept that the close corporation is an
entity unto itself. Several provisions in the new act, such as those
specifically allowing transfer restrictions and informal board action,
are of practical value only to the close corporation. And numerous
others, like those relaxing the formalities of the voting trust and
those allowing the use of shareholder agreements, make the operation
of the close corporation much simpler than it was in the past. All of
these elements are tempered by the all-inclusive effect of the provisions protecting the rights of minority shareholders; though not
limited to the close corporation, these provisions should turn out to be
of more value to its minority shareholders than to those of the publicissue enterprise. A minority shareholder in a close corporation knows
when he is being oppressed-such a situation is not always obvious
to the man who owns ten shares of General Motors.
The new act is the culmination of a long and tedious process,
involving never-ending meetings, discussions, and revisions. Its final
form combines an anticipation of possible problem areas with a lack
of rigidity to create a viable, living business association. The General
Assembly has finally modernized Kentucky's corporation law; the
formation of an ever-increasing number of close corporations in the
Commonwealth should not be far behind.
Patrick A. Thompson
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

dissolved in 1940 had the power to continue to settle its affairs by a suit instituted
in 1948 to set aside a 1948 conveyance of realty by the corporation's debtors.
Blackerby v. Monarch Equip., 259 S.W.2d 683 (Ky. 1953). And a corporation,
more than two years after dissolution, had the capacity to sue as a nominal party
to set aside a forfeiture and sale of land which it owned at the time of forfeiture.
Smith v. Commonwealth Land & Lumber Co., 189 S.W. 912 (Ky. 1916).
185 KIES § 417.010. For a discussion of common law arbitration, see Ham,
supra note 51, at 181.
186 See Graham v. McAdoo, 123 S.W. 260 (Ky. 1909). See also H. HFENN,
LAw OF ConpORAnONs § 269.
187 KRSA § 271A.170(2); MoDEL Bus. Corp. Acr ANN. 2n § 34 (1971).

